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7
From Dublin to Lisbon: Ireland’s EU Reform
Treaty Referendums and Their Lessons for
Europe
Katelyn Walker

The Irish people were long thought to be among the most enthusiastic Europeans.
Since 1988, Eurobarometer polling1 has shown that Irish citizens are significantly more
likely to view their country’s membership in the European Union (EU) as a good thing than
citizens of other countries. Since the mid-1990s, approval of EU membership in Ireland was
often twenty points higher than the EU average (Sinnott, Elkink, O’Rourke & McBride,
2009, p. 2). Despite this, a low turnout of voters rejected the EU’s Treaty of Nice in 20012,
and a relatively high turnout of voters rejected the Treaty of Lisbon in 2008 (Ibid, p. 6).
The latter referendum launched a sense of “political groundhog’s day” (O’Brennan, 2009,
p. 270), as Irish politicians and European elites tried to discern how a country that has selfadmittedly benefited so much from EU membership could squash the very reforms needed
to make the Union operate more effectively—twice.
When asked why the Irish voted against the Treaty of Lisbon, former Irish Prime
Minister John Bruton explained that the Irish view the European Union through their
pocketbooks rather than through their hearts (2008). They had not been as affected by several shared European traumas (such as the Cold War and the two World Wars) as had the
states in the geographic core of Europe. Thus, as many European states sought peace and
prosperity from the Union, Ireland primarily sought prosperity. This analysis explains the
referendum results for both treaties to some extent. Given that Ireland had recently joined
the ranks of the wealthy nations within the European Union, it had achieved its goal of
prosperity. By 2001, Ireland had grown so wealthy that it would lose many of its subsidies,
thus removing the factor that had previously driven many Irish both to vote and vote yes in
referendums on European Treaties. Ireland needed to re-evaluate its role in the European
Union, and a new equilibrium within the electorate on European reform treaties would
1 Eurobarometer is a biannual series of public opinion polling released about the European Union and its member
states.
2 Another referendum on the Treaty of Nice was held in 2002, and a much higher turnout of voters approved the
treaty (Sinnott et al, 2009, 6).
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logically follow. This search for a new role in Europe came at a time when Irish campaign
laws were changing, several domestic concerns dominated, and outreach and education of
European issues remained poor. This proved to be a toxic combination for the ‘Yes’ campaigns for both the Treaties of Nice and Lisbon.
This paper discusses why the Irish voted against Nice and Lisbon, focusing particularly on the Treaty of Lisbon. The first section briefly chronicles the history of European
reform efforts since 2000 and summarizes the changes proposed in the Lisbon Treaty. The
next section analyzes the debate over the necessity of a referendum on the Lisbon Treaty
in Ireland, arguing that a referendum was politically unavoidable even if it was potentially
not constitutionally mandated. The following section addresses several causes of the ‘No’
votes in the Irish referendums on both Nice and Lisbon and discusses two issues that played
a particularly important role solely in the first Lisbon referendum. The next section discusses
why Ireland overturned its decision in the second referendum on Lisbon. To conclude, this
paper discusses the need for a common curriculum on European Union issues.
European Reform Efforts in the 21st Century
As the European Union prepared to extend membership to several eastern European nations, EU leaders realized that extensive institutional reform would be necessary
to streamline operations in an enlarged Union. Specifically, the existing fifteen members
sought to reduce the size of the European Commission, remove unanimity requirements
for decision-making in several topic areas, and establish the number of votes each member
state would carry in the European Parliament and Council post-enlargement. The Treaty
of Nice emerged in 2002 as the first attempt at reform; however, many viewed the treaty
as a flawed and temporary compromise among states pursuing only their national interests
(Dinan, 2005, pp. 170-171). The governments of Europe consolidated all existing treaties
and proposed reforms into the Treaty Establishing a Constitution for Europe (commonly
known as the EU Constitution) in 2004, but voters in France and the Netherlands rejected
the treaty in 2005. Lawmakers repackaged most of the constitutional reforms into the Treaty
of Lisbon, which was ratified in late 2009.
Many of the reforms contained within the Lisbon Treaty are technical, complicated,
and unglamorous. Generally speaking, reformers sought to increase the EU’s efficiency,
grant a larger role to the member states, address the perceived democratic deficit within the
EU, and pursue more areas of cooperation. Some of the key reforms are summarized below:
•
•
•
•

•
•

A thirty-month presidency of the European Council (elected by the Council itself) will replace the current six-month rotating presidency.
A “High Representative of Foreign Affairs and Security Policy” will be appointed.
The Charter of Fundamental Rights will become legally binding.
The number of commissioners in the European Commission will be reduced to
two-thirds the number of member states, abolishing the current system of universal Commission representation3. However, the Lisbon Treaty allows the European
Council to unanimously decide to have a different number of commissioners.
Decisions in more areas will be made by qualified majority voting (QMV).
National parliaments will have an official mechanism to review and challenge EU

3 However, the Treaty of Nice required that the number of European Commissioners be reduced to an unspecified
number when the EU has 27 members. The 27th member of the EU joined in 2007.
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legislation.
Member states should pledge to defend one another in the instance of an armed
attack or natural disaster4.
Should the member states unanimously approve, the EU may develop a common
defense5.

Was a Referendum Necessary in Ireland?
The Irish referendum on the Treaty of Nice proved what few thought possible: that
the Irish people would vote against a European treaty despite holding the EU in generally
high regard. Irish academics therefore briefly considered the possibility that Ireland not hold
a referendum on the Treaty of Lisbon, lest history repeat itself. The 1986 Irish Supreme
Court Case Crotty vs. An Taoiseach established that European treaties that significantly alter
“the essential scope or objectives” of the EU must be amended to the Irish Constitution,
which can only be amended by referendum. In its decision, the Court found that Title III of
the Single European Act violated the Irish Constitution by introducing measures to increase
cooperation in the realm of foreign policy. However, other aspects of the Single European
Act—such as changes to qualified majority rules and expansions of the EU-level court system—were not found to be a violation of the Irish Constitution (Fanning, 2008, para. 8).
Since the decision, all reform treaties have been put to a vote. Accession treaties, however, have been ratified by the parliament, which undermines the commonly held viewpoint that all EU treaties must be submitted to a referendum in Ireland. One can interpret
the Crotty ruling to mean that Ireland must amend its constitution to give the European
Union entirely new responsibilities, but no amendment is necessary to approve changes to
existing powers. Given this interpretation, it is not so clear that the Lisbon Treaty is unconstitutional, especially when one considers that the Crotty ruling did not reject changes in
qualified majority voting structures (which would most arguably impinge upon Irish sovereignty). The Lisbon Treaty altered the structure of the EU in several ways, but it did not
create entirely new responsibilities. Other contentious portions of the Lisbon Treaty, such
as the loss of a permanent commissioner and increased peacekeeping responsibilities, existed
in the Nice Treaty. The legal debate is whether Ireland would need to resubmit questions
to the Irish voters that they have already considered (multiple times, in some cases) when
they appear in new treaties.
No legal precedent has since been established for the use of parliamentary ratification
procedures for European reform treaties. The Irish government is understandably reluctant to challenge the conventional wisdom on treaty ratifications because the consequences
would be great if the government were to get it wrong. If the parliament ratified the Lisbon
Treaty without a referendum, the same parties that brought about the Crotty lawsuit would
surely launch a legal challenge to the Treaty. Should the Supreme Court determine that the
Lisbon Treaty did, in fact, constitute a significant enough change to the nature of the European Union to require a referendum, it would be difficult for politicians to convince the
public to vote for the treaty that they had tried to pass above the voters’ heads.
Such a judgment would also pose serious logistical problems to the EU at large if the
4 Neutral states are exempt, and NATO members are expected to fulfill this pledge through NATO.
5 For more information on these and other provisions of the Lisbon Treaty, please see the Department of Foreign
Affairs White Paper on the Lisbon Treaty (2009) or the Referendum Commission’s Extended Guide to the Lisbon
Treaty (2009).
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treaty had already taken effect by the time the Supreme Court issued its decision. For example, the Lisbon Treaty fixed the number of members of the European Parliament at 751,
up from 736: which of the fifteen parliamentarians would give up their jobs while the Irish
re-ratified the treaty (DFA, 2009, p. 45)? Which country would hold the old, rotating presidency if the newly created permanent presidency were to suddenly and unexpectedly be
abolished? Such questions may prove to be impossible to answer, and Ireland may thus need
to leave the Union until it can ratify the treaty. Considering the possibility of such severe
political consequences both domestically and at a European level, the Irish government was
correct to take the safer route to ratification regardless of the constitutionality of the Lisbon
Treaty. In the future, however, it would be most helpful if the Irish government submits a
treaty to the Supreme Court for review prior to calling a referendum so that the Court may
establish more precedents regarding the compatibility of several European practices with the
Irish Constitution.
Why Have EU Referendums Failed in Ireland?
A Noncommittal Electorate
In order to succeed, proponents of Nice would have needed to overcome a particular
weakness in the Irish electorate: that despite high levels of stated support for the European Union, voters generally lack enthusiasm for and knowledge about European issues.
The Eurobarometer had continually shown the Irish were much more supportive of their
membership in the EU than other Europeans were. However, the European Commission
Representation in Ireland found that, “Issues having to do with the European Union are a
minority interest in Ireland,” with half of the electorate (51%) placing themselves below the
mid-point or registering no opinion on a scale measuring interest in European affairs (Sinnott, 2001, p. 3). The Eurobarometer has shown that levels of sadness over a hypothetical
dissolution of the EU have ranged between 30% and 60% since 1973, significantly lower
than the support levels for membership (which have ranged between 45% and 80% over the
same period) (Sinnott et al, 2009, pp. 2-3). As a result, in order for a referendum to succeed,
the treaty’s proponents need to overcome general lack of enthusiasm for and knowledge
about European issues6.
A review of Eurobarometer surveys surrounding both the Nice and the Lisbon campaigns show that little has changed in the attitudes of the Irish electorate between the two
treaties. In the months immediately preceding the first referendums on both the Nice and
Lisbon Treaties, the Eurobarometer found levels of support of EU membership to be at 72%
(Sinnott, 2001, p. ii) and 73% (Eurobarometer, 2008, p. 12) respectively—both well above
the EU average. However, knowledge about the EU had appeared to increase since 2001.
When Ireland voted on the Nice Treaty, only 12% of the electorate could answer at least
two of three basic questions about European institutions7. Increases of the level of knowledge were measurable between the two Nice referendums (Sinnott, 2003, p. i.): 57% of
6 Richard Sinnott discusses this trend in depth in his 2001 report, “Attitudes and Behaviour of the Irish Electorate
in the Referendum on the Treaty of Nice.”
7 True/False: (1) The EU currently consists of fifteen Member States; (2) Switzerland is a member of the European
Union; (3) Every six months, a different Member State becomes the President of the Council of the European
Union; (4) The euro area currently consists of twelve member states. The questioning from the Nice Survey excluded the fourth question, but all other questions were included (Sinnott et al, 2008, p. 5).
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eligible voters could answer two of four questions by 2008 (Sinnott et al, 2009, p. 5). Given
that the most commonly given reason for rejecting the Nice Treaty was because voters did
not understand what the treaty entailed, and that voters who had less objective knowledge
about the EU were more likely to abstain from voting or vote against the treaty, the Lisbon
Treaty should have been more likely to pass than the Nice Treaty. The Lisbon Treaty did
not pass, but it remained true that those claiming not to understand the treaty or the EU
were less likely to vote and more likely to vote ‘no.’
Economic Transitions
When Ireland acceded to the European Union in 1973, it was one of the EU’s poorest
states and thus the recipient of large subsidies. Even as most economic indicators in Ireland
began to catch up to EU averages, Ireland still received €5826.1 billion from 1994 to 1999.
As the Irish considered the Nice Treaty, their country was about to become a net contributor to the EU budget. The economic narrative presented during the Nice campaign held
that the European Union was largely responsible for Ireland’s newfound wealth, and passing
the Nice Treaty would allow other states to benefit from the same opportunities. Many
supporters seemed to imply that the Irish were morally obligated to pass the Nice Treaty
because of all the help Ireland had received from the EU. However, many feared the treaty
would force Ireland to increase the low corporate tax rate credited with much of the Celtic
Tiger’s economic rise (Miller, 2001, pp. 8-9).
Such fears did not dissipate upon ratification of the Nice Treaty. In fact, the fear of
an EU-mandated corporate tax heightened as Ireland considered the Lisbon Treaty. At the
time of the Lisbon campaign, many families thus owned homes worth less than their mortgages. Unemployment had also begun to rise (Kelly, 2009, pp. 4-6). The Irish economy
was contracting at the time of the Lisbon campaign, and Ireland would formally become the
first eurozone state to enter a recession three months later (O’Brien, 2008, para. 1). Ireland’s
boom-and-bust cycle helped boost the ‘No’ vote (compared with the Nice campaign) for
two important reasons. It allowed the ‘No’ campaign to redefine the role of the European
Union in the Irish economy and sharpened the views of unskilled workers who felt they had
lost out in the EU enlargement facilitated by the Nice Treaty.
The arguments that the European Union had done much for the Irish economy do not
resonate during a contractionary period. However, the false claim that the Lisbon Treaty
would force Ireland to increase its corporate tax rate continued to resonate, this time with
added urgency and a fear of higher unemployment. The assertion that Ireland would have
to increase its corporate tax rate was demonstrably untrue, but those who believed it were
significantly more likely to vote against the treaty (Sinnott et al, 2009, p. 31).
The influx of Eastern European immigrants helped fuel the boom by providing an
ever-expanding pool of workers—eventually constituting 15% of all construction workers
(Kelly, 2009, p. 6). However, many native Irish unskilled workers believed the immigrants’
presence led to a decrease in wages, and some also thought that foreign workers led to an
increase in native unemployment levels (Sinnott et al, 2009, p. 36). The veracity of this
claim is debatable, as aggregate wage levels had been steadily increasing until the contraction
began (including through the 2004 enlargement) (Kelly, 2009, p. 8), and many unskilled
foreign workers returned to their native countries when jobs began to disappear (The Economist, 2009). After the Lisbon referendum, the Irish Department of Foreign Affairs found
that unskilled workers, particularly those who believed that the EU had driven Irish wages
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down, were substantially more likely to vote against the Lisbon Treaty (Sinnott et al, 2009,
p. 34). Ireland was one of three EU members to open its borders to the new EU members
immediately upon their accession, but it attracted a disproportionate number of immigrants
in relation to the total native population. Workers began to sympathize with France’s fears
of the “Polish plumber” stealing native jobs during this period. In these voters’ eyes, the fact
that Ireland had so many foreign workers and the fact that Ireland was the only contracting
economy in the eurozone were linked.
Younger voters from lower socio-economic classes were less likely to support the
European Union. Polling conducted on behalf of the Department of Foreign Affairs found
that such voters could not identify specific benefits of the European Union, but could
identify rising interest rates, prices, and immigration levels as negative consequences of
the EU membership (Millward Brown IMS, 2008, p. 20). Young voters were born well
after Ireland acceded to the European Union and came of age as the Celtic Tiger grew to
be one of Europe’s wealthiest states. It is not surprising, therefore, that they would take a
more negative view on the European Union once the economy had soured. These voters’
parents and grandparents, however, have stronger memories of the era during which Ireland
was one of Europe’s poorest countries, and tended to support the Lisbon Treaty to a much
greater extent.
Irish Neutrality
One of the core themes of Ireland’s statehood, one that figures prominently in their
national dialog, has been neutrality in foreign policy (Hayward, 2002, p. 185). As a constitutionally neutral nation, Ireland had been an outlier within the European Union as a
non-NATO member. However, Ireland had joined NATO’s Partnership for Peace (PfP)
in 1999 after the Government reneged on a promise to hold a referendum on the issue
(Rees, 2005, p. 63). The Nice Treaty enabled the creation of a Rapid Reaction Force for
peacekeeping efforts, which prompted fears the EU would eventually militarize. As a result,
the loss of neutrality became a prominent issue in the ‘No’ campaign, and several ‘No’ voters were found to have factored it into their decision (Sinnott, 2001, p. i). When this fact
emerged after the referendum, the Irish government sought and obtained a legally binding
declaration from other EU members (the Seville Declaration) stating that Ireland could participate in UN-sanctioned peacekeeping assignments and in the EU Common Foreign and
Security policy under certain conditions and that the EU would respect Ireland’s neutrality.
The Seville Declaration helped convince voters to eventually approve the Nice Treaty in
2002.
The Lisbon Treaty clarified, rather than changed, the role of existing European defense
structures. Furthermore, Ireland and other neutral nations had successfully negotiated exclusions for neutral nations and requirements that major decisions be taken unanimously (Department of Foreign Affairs, 2009, p. 66-67). Under Lisbon, the only changes to Ireland’s
security policies would have been changes Ireland opted to take. Nevertheless, concerns
about neutrality and conscription in a European army drove portions of the ‘No’ voters and
helped explain the overwhelming tendency of women to vote against the treaty (Bruton,
2008). The fact that this issue was so easily recycled between the campaigns demonstrates
that the EU has not done enough to assuage voter concerns.
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Bertie Ahern’s Resignation and the Mahon Tribunal
In 2006, Prime Minister Bertie Ahern faced allegations of financial impropriety. Ahern
announced his resignation in April 2008 during his investigation by the Tribunal of Inquiry
into Certain Planning Matters and Payments (commonly called the Mahon Tribunal), just
over two months before the Lisbon referendum (Quinn & Cowell, 2008, para. 8). He has
always maintained his innocence, but hoped that his appearance before the tribunal would
be less of a distraction during the Lisbon campaign if he resigned. Members of his cabinet
claimed the party lost no credibility amidst these allegations, but leaders in opposition parties
complained the tribunal could damage the ‘Yes’ campaign (RTÉ News, 2008, para. 1), especially since the Mahon Tribunal dominated the news cycle in the weeks leading up to the
Lisbon referendum. Ahern’s replacement, Brian Cowen, was not particularly charismatic
and never enjoyed the same level of popular support as Ahern (Qvortrup, 2009, p. 62).
Polling conducted by the European Commission throughout the campaign shows that
Ahern’s resignation did little to restore the Irish people’s faith in the government (Eurobarometer, 2008, p. 4). Dissatisfaction with the ruling government had a large impact on a
voter’s likelihood of approving the treaty. The Irish Department of Foreign Affairs found
that roughly two thirds of voters stating they were “quite dissatisfied” or “very dissatisfied”
with the ruling government voted against the Lisbon Treaty (Sinnott et al, 2009, p. 23).
Given the level of dissatisfaction with the governing coalition and with Irish political institutions in general, the ‘Yes’ campaign could not rely on the broad level of political support
that the political elites accorded to the treaty to deliver a favorable vote.
Declan Ganley and the Libertas Institute
Prior to the campaign on the Lisbon Treaty, the anti-EU elements within Irish society
were often disjointed and underfunded. One unique feature of the Lisbon campaign was
the emergence of Libertas Institute, a think tank which provided some 800,000 euros to
the ‘No’ campaign (Keena, 2009, para. 9), which allowed the ‘No’ campaign to conduct
a large-scale professional campaign for the first time. The Irish Times portrayed Libertas as
“simply a name being used by Galway-based Declan Ganley for the expression of his views
on the treaty and the direction of the European Union.” Ganley is a wealthy businessman
who has written for conservative American think tanks and who heads a defense contracting firm with several former high-level American military officers, prompting concerns that
Ganley’s involvement was part of a plot by British euroskeptics and American neoconservatives to prevent Lisbon’s passing (Keena, 2008). Ganley’s chief complaint was that Ireland’s
influence within the EU would be diminished under Lisbon, citing the decrease of Ireland’s
voting weights, the loss of national vetoes via increased use of QMV, and the ability of the
European Court of Justice to overturn national legislation. Ganley further complained that
Lisbon would force Ireland to cede its own powers to Brussels, particularly in taxation and
security policies (McKrittick, 2008). Because of the amount of money at its disposal, Libertas was able to flood Irish towns with high-quality advertising material against the treaty.
Though Ganley’s claims tended to range from outright untruths to partial truths lacking
proper context, his campaigns were able to give voters short, easy-to-remember, specific
reasons to vote against the treaty8.

8 It is worth noting that the Libertas website and all of its platforms are no longer available on the internet.
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The Defeat of the First Lisbon Referendum
On June 12, 2008, Irish voters rejected the Lisbon Treaty by 52.3%. Turnout was
53.1% (Sinnott et al, 2009, p. i). This means that about 28% of the total electorate voted
against the treaty—compared with 19% of the electorate voting against Nice in the 2001
referendum. A higher percentage of the total electorate voted against the Lisbon Treaty than
all other European reform treaties in Ireland’s history (Sinnott et al, 2009, p. 6). These results
undermine the tendency to dismiss the Nice Treaty rejection as a fluke. At the time, some
argued the rejection arose from complacency and low turnout9. According to this theory,
many voters believed that there was no possibility of Nice not passing and could thus not
be bothered to vote; still more people voted against the treaty (also assuming it would pass)
as a small token of protest against an administration that was growing less popular. Because of this “accident,” voters developed a greater understanding of the stakes involved in
European reform, and turnout increased to allow for the “correct” response in the second
referendum—the response that voters intended all along. It may be plausible for voter complacency to catch a government off guard and potentially prevent reform once; however, it
is unreasonable to assert that voters “not knowing better” would derail two treaties in less
than a decade.
The alarming fact remains that several areas of concern to the Irish voters in the Lisbon
Treaty are issues recycled from the Nice Treaty, which demonstrates that the Union has still
not done enough to earn its citizens’ trust. Furthermore, as with the Nice Treaty, several of
the common reasons for voting against the treaty are demonstrably false, showing that the
Irish government and political parties (nearly all of which support the treaty) do a poor job
of communicating European goals with their voters. It appears as though the voters, who
turned out in large numbers to vote on Lisbon, did learn from the Nice debacle. One might
argue, however, that their take-home lesson was not that European reform matters, but that
a rejection of a treaty can yield a much-wanted concession—in this case an agreement to
universal European Commission representation (Fitzgerald, 2009, para. 20-22).
The Second Referendum on the Treaty of Lisbon
Irish voters’ rejection of the Treaty of Lisbon triggered another panic among Irish and
European elites. European Union leaders believed the fundamental institutional reforms
contained within the Treaty of Lisbon were necessary as quickly as possible, and Ireland
had the very real possibility of thwarting these goals. As a result, Ireland began a process
of soul-searching after the first referendum on the Treaty of Lisbon. Two factors became
instrumental in overturning the results of the first referendum: a series of clarifications and a
concession from the European Council and the onset of the global economic crisis.
The European Council’s “Guarantees”
The European Council met in June 2009 to discuss the future of the Lisbon Treaty.
At this meeting, the Irish government agreed to hold a second referendum in exchange for
a series of agreements collectively known as the “Guarantees.” The Guarantees clarified
several issues of concern to Irish voters. They also included a statement by the Irish government discussing how Ireland would interpret certain clauses. However, the most important
9 Turnout in the first referendum on the Treaty of Nice was 34%, which provided substantial justification for the
second vote (Sinnott et al, 2009, 6).
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product of this European Council meeting—the agreement to universal Commission representation—did not appear in the Guarantees. These Guarantees co-opted many of the ‘No’
campaigns talking points, giving the Government and other ‘Yes’ advocates more freedom
to discuss the treaty on their own terms.
The first portion of the Guarantees is the “Decision of the Heads of State or Government of the 27 Member States of the EU, Meeting within the European Council, on the
Concerns of the Irish People on the Treaty of Lisbon” (known as the “Decision.”) This
agreement addressed specific areas of contention in plain terms. In its three sections, the
Decision addressed social policies, taxation, and security and defense, stating that the Lisbon
Treaty would not affect Ireland’s policies on “the protection of the right to life, […] the
protection of the family, […] and the protections of the rights in respect of education” (p.
1), that it would not change the EU’s “competence in relation to taxation,” and that it “does
not affect or prejudice Ireland’s traditional policy of military neutrality” (p. 2). It also formally states that the treaty does not create a European army, that it remains a member state’s
choice to participate in the European Defense Agency and any military operations, and that
all states must unanimously approve any move to a common defense (p. 2). The Decision
is a legally binding document to be registered in the Treaty Section of the UN Secretariat
along with the Lisbon Treaty (Institute of International and European Affairs, 2009, p. 3).
The Decision is convincing in its brevity. The treaty itself is 272 pages of legalese that
virtually no one could be expected to understand. Thus, the ‘No’ campaign’s arguments
could pass a certain plausibility test, as it was difficult to prove their claims were not true.
The debate, therefore, often was about the source of an argument rather than the argument
itself. The Decision is three pages long and written in plain English. Voters could thus easily
ascertain for themselves what the Lisbon Treaty would and would not do with regards to
these specific areas.
The National Declaration by Ireland affixes an Irish interpretation to the Council’s
Guarantees. It seeks to allay concerns that Ireland would be forced to abandon its traditional
neutrality. The Decision declares that all states would need to unanimously approve a move
toward a common defense. In the National Declaration, the Irish government explains that
joining a common defense would clearly violate the Irish Constitution’s requirement of
military neutrality. As a result, the Government would need to hold a referendum authorizing an amendment to the constitution before considering such a move (p. 6). The National
Declaration served as a promise to Irish voters that larger states could not bully Ireland into
joining a common defense, nor can the Irish government pass such a measure over the voters’ heads. The Irish electorate would therefore hold veto power over any common defense
plans.
The European Council’s most notable guarantee, however, was not formally contained within the Guarantees. At the June Council meeting, the Heads of State and Government all agreed to allow each state to keep its representative to the European Commission
(Institute of International and European Affairs, 2009, p. 1). This concession is significant
at both the Irish and the European level. It is significant domestically because Ireland had
fought for universal Commission representation throughout the treaty negotiations, but
lost. Richard Sinnott, a political scientist at University College Dublin, found that 65% of
all voters considered Commission representation when voting in the first referendum on
Lisbon, and those that prioritized Commission representation were more inclined to vote
against the treaty (Sinnott et al, 2009, p. 28). Ireland’s ability to negotiate a deal to keep its
Ireland’s EU Reform Treaty Referendums and Their Lessons for Europe
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commissioner helped assuage voters’ fears that Irish concerns would not be voiced in the
Union. On a basic level, permanent Commission representation ensures that Ireland would
always maintain a presence on one of the key European institutions. More fundamentally,
however, the Irish government proved to its voters that on important issues, Irish priorities
would not necessarily lose out to the wishes of larger and more powerful states.
This concession also represents a significant departure from the European Union’s
previous negotiations with countries that had rejected European treaties. The agreement to
universal Commission representation is the first time the member states approved a change
that will directly affect the operations of the entire EU. When Danish voters rejected the
Maastricht Treaty in 1992, Denmark negotiated a series of opt-outs for itself, but the treaty
remained the same for the rest of the EU. As discussed in Chapter III, the Seville Declaration sought to ease Irish concerns following its disapproval of the Treaty of Nice, but
it changed neither the contents nor the interpretation of the treaty itself. Following the
Dutch and French rejections of the EU Constitution in 2005, the European Union agreed
to renegotiate the Constitution, eventually producing the Lisbon Treaty. Arguably, treaty
renegotiation can be a major concession. However, the most significant difference between
the Constitution and the Lisbon Treaty is format, and Lisbon’s format was designed such
that fewer states would hold referendums on the same substantive reforms. As a result,
the renegotiation of the Constitution was a circumvention of voters’ wishes, rather than a
concession to them. While the 2009 Guarantees are similar to those negotiated in the 2002
Seville Declaration to Ireland following its rejection of the Treaty of Nice, the agreement to
alter the previously agreed upon nature of European-level reforms is unprecedented. This
move played a sizeable role in the campaign and may have the greatest long-term impact on
the European Union’s operations. However, the drastic weakening of the global economy
dominated Irish concerns during the second campaign and played the largest role in reversing the ‘No’ vote.
The Onset of the Global Recession
When Ireland voted on the Treaty of Lisbon in 2008, it was the only member of the
eurozone to have just completed a second consecutive quarter of contraction. As a result,
many voters did not accept arguments that the European Union helps the Irish economy.
Several believed that the EU’s enlargement had in fact hurt Ireland’s economy. As stated
in the introduction, former Irish Prime Minister John Bruton explained to an American
audience that the Irish tend to view Europe “not from their hearts, but from their pocketbooks,” and that this sentiment served as a partial explanation for Ireland’s rejection of
Lisbon in 2008. However, if Bruton’s assessment is correct, this line of thinking saved the
Lisbon Treaty in 2009.
By the second referendum on Lisbon in October 2009, the Irish economy had deteriorated. In May 2009, the International Monetary Fund (IMF) predicted that Ireland would
see the largest negative impact in the current recession (p. 1). The Irish GDP contracted by
7.1% in 2009 (a figure which reflects some mild improvements seen in the fourth quarter
of 2009—after the second referendum on Lisbon) (Central Statistics Office, 2010b, p. 1).
Furthermore, unemployment stood at 12.7% in October 2009, compared with 5.5% when
the Irish first voted on Lisbon in June 2008 (Central Statistics Office, 2010a, p. 4). Overall,
the IMF predicted that Ireland’s economy would contract by 13.5% from 2008 to 2010
(International Monetary Fund, 2009, p. 5).
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This contraction had a painfully large impact on one of Ireland’s biggest industries:
construction. This sector constituted 20% of the Irish GNP in 2006 and 13% of total employment in 2008 (Kelly, 2009, p. 6). As noted earlier, a real estate bubble drove much
of the growth in the construction industry in the 2000s. Housing costs in particular were
overvalued prior to 2008, and there was wide availability of easy credit. These two factors
artificially boosted the construction industry through the end of 2007 (Central Statistics
Office, 2010b, p. 10). Ireland had also become the second most expensive place to do business in the EU (behind Luxembourg), and foreign direct investment (FDI) flows to Ireland
were falling faster than in the rest of the eurozone (International Monetary Fund, 2009, p.
9). As a result, voters could predict that even when growth rates returned to normal, the
construction workers would not be able to depend on getting their jobs back, and they may
not be able to find work in the manufacturing sector. Ireland faces a structural readjustment
to its economy that will disproportionately impact its poorest workers as Ireland transitions
away from primary and secondary sector economic activities. Voters understood that EU
membership could help ease the pains of this transition.
The Irish economy was clearly worse off in October 2009 than it was in June 2008.
However, if one applies Bruton’s analysis to the latter referendum, it becomes clear that two
key differences prevented voters from deciding once again to reject the Lisbon Treaty in
light of continued economic uncertainty. First, the global economic crisis plunged the entire
European Union into a recession. Irish voters had held the attitude that they in particular
had been negatively by the EU’s enlargement and the disproportionate flow of eastern European immigrants into Ireland. That concern would have logically decreased when the rest
of the European Union also faced an economic crisis. In fact, this may be modern Europe’s
first shared trauma in which Ireland is a full participant. Meanwhile, as Ireland’s economy
worsened, it became clear that Ireland was more secure within the European Union than
it would have been as an independent economy. Ireland’s membership in the eurozone has
shielded it from the currency pressures that often accompany financial crises. It has also provided Ireland access to financing from the European Central Bank, which helped maintain
liquidity in Irish banks (International Monetary Fund, 2009, p. 3). Both the IMF and Irish
voters believed Ireland’s membership in the EU would be instrumental to its recovery.
Statistically speaking, this belief was the most important factor in reversing Ireland’s
initial rejection of the Treaty of Lisbon. A Flash Eurobarometer conducted after the second
referendum found that, among those who either did not participate or voted against the
treaty in the first referendum, belief that the EU would help the Irish economy was the most
commonly given explanation for their change of heart (2009, p. 20). Overall, 23% of ‘Yes’
voters cited this belief as the most important reason for their vote (Ibid, p. 9). The youngest
voters were most likely to cite this justification, which is significant because young voters
were most likely to vote against the Treaty of Lisbon in the first referendum (Ibid, p. 11).
The Second Referendum on Lisbon Passes
On October 2, 2009, Irish voters approved the Treaty of Lisbon with 67.1% of the
vote (Eurobarometer, 2009, p. 4). Turnout had increased to 59% of the electorate (Ibid, p.
7), the highest turnout on an EU referendum since Ireland voted on the Single European
Act in 1987 (Sinnott et al, 2009, p. 6).
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Conclusion: What Does This Mean for Europe?
Too many Eurocrats are stuck in their belief that European citizens will embrace
further integration because its benefits are self-evident. Since 2001, four referendums on
European treaties have failed in three countries. This is no coincidence, and the European
Union can glean much from these results. One of the most significant trends to note is that
many voters do not know much about the European Union—both by their own admission and as demonstrated by their inability to answer basic questions about the EU. More
importantly, those who do not understand the EU or its proposed reforms tend to view the
EU less positively and vote against its treaties when given the opportunity (if they vote at
all—abstention rates are also much higher). In short, if they do not know, they vote no—in
line with a popular slogan in the Nice and Lisbon campaigns. Furthermore, voters not sufficiently educated on the EU can also fall prey to misinformation (such as that distributed
by Declan Ganley). They can also misunderstand the impact of a proposed change. For
example, many voters in the Lisbon referendum believed Ireland would go entirely without
representation to the EU in the years it did not have a commissioner (Millward Brown IMS,
2008, p. 14)10. For these reasons, one can question the wisdom of allowing voters to decide
a complicated and wide-reaching set of amendments to EU treaties. However, to deduce
that the European Union should ignore the problem by avoiding referendums would miss
the point. What can the European Union do to keep voters informed?
The key to ensuring European success is education. Citizens in well-functioning democracies learn about their own political institutions during their primary and/or secondary
schooling. Education about European-level governance in the individual member states is
inconsistent, at best. This is not acceptable in an increasingly integrated EU, where countries
have estimated that at least 10% (and in some countries much higher) of all legislation passed
at the national level is passed to come into compliance with European regulations (CliveMatthews, 2009), and where the European Central Bank directly dictates many economic
policies. In Ireland, a three-year course on civic education has been required of middleschool students since 1997 (Curriculum Online). Its efficacy is debatable, however; program
graduates fall in the age range that is most likely to abstain from voting and least likely to
vote for the treaty (Sinnott et al, 2009, p. 16). In the Irish case, a more focused curriculum
on the European Union is necessary, something the Sub-Committee on Ireland’s Future
in the European Union noted after the failure of the first Lisbon referendum (Oireachtas,
2008, pp. 60-61). The European Union itself should also take steps to ensure a universal
curriculum imparting a core set of knowledge (such as the duties of various European institutions and the process of passing legislation). Member states should have the opportunity
to inject additional components into the curriculum as they see fit, and the EU should not
dictate national curriculums in other subjects. However, the European Union must ensure
that each of its citizens—citizens that vote in the European Parliamentary elections, citizens
that vote in referendums on EU reform and accession treaties, citizens that live under the
Union’s rules every day— adequately understand the workings of the EU itself. Improved
education may not guarantee that any given European treaty will pass: voters who once rejected EU treaties out of apathy may find very concrete reasons to justify future ‘No’ votes.
However, thoughtful debate will strengthen both the European Union and its opponents,
and the EU can form a more perfect Union of its own.
10 The loss of a commissioner was a statistically significant reason for voting against the Lisbon Treaty in research
conducted by Millward Brown IMS (2008, p. 14) and the Department of Foreign Affairs (Sinnott et al, 2009, p. 14).
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